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Abstract
Icebreakers have traditionally been seen as symbols of technological nationalism.
While ship science for open-water vessels developed during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, understanding of how to cope with polar and subarc-
tic ice conditions lagged behind. This led state organizations in charge of icebreaking
services to minimize risks in the development of new vessels by encouraging trans-
national expert cooperation. This article argues that such interactions were critical
to the evolution of the modern icebreaker. We examine the development of three
icebreakers in different countries in successive decades, and the critical technologies
with which they are associated: the Ymer from Sweden and diesel–electric propulsion
(1933); the American ‘Wind’ class and power-hull proportion (1942–1946); and the
Voima from Finland and twin bow propellers (1956). We reconstruct the flow of
information to explain the rationale for transnational cooperation in maritime tech-
nology development. The concept of ‘technology carriers’ is deployed in the analysis
to enhance understanding of the role of international cooperation in polar and win-
ter seafaring.
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Icebreakers are gigantic, sophisticated machines bearing state flags and the fame of heroic
missions. As tangible objects of competence and prowess, they have become symbols of
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technological nationalism: Ymer (1933), the first diesel–electric icebreaker, was a feat of
Swedish electrical engineering, while the US ‘Wind’ class (1942–1946) icebreakers
demonstrated the capability of the superpower to penetrate polar ice and the Finnish
Voima (1954) marked the entrance of a peripheral country into the high-tech industry.
Icebreakers are vessels of national importance in winter navigation countries, while
they are fairly recent and curious exceptions in the annals of maritime history. In fact,
fewer than 50 full icebreakers were launched between the late nineteenth century and
the 1950s.
The specific significance of icebreakers, combined with their minor relevance to main-
stream maritime history, has rendered icebreaker studies subject to non-scientific historical
reviews written as stories for state institutions, such as the US Coast Guard,1 or to honour
national milestones, like the centenary of Finnish winter navigation.2When viewed through
such national lenses, technological developments in icebreaking have appeared more as a
series of innovations stemming from the natural conditions of the given country and dem-
onstrating the modern technical prowess of the nation. This nationalistic tendency in ice-
breaker histories contradicts the international tone of maritime history. Norwegian
economic and maritime historian Stig Tenold has recently noted that all maritime history
crosses borders and that this international dimension provides avenues for cooperation
between neighbouring fields, such as economic, cultural and industrial studies.3
This article employs history of technology methods to analyse evolutionary technolo-
gical developments through a study of material artefacts and engineering networks. It
focuses on how icebreaking technology was developed and transmitted by a transnational
network of engineers and experts working in close cooperation with shipyards and state
actors between 1890 and 1954. While icebreaking occupies a marginal space in maritime
technology, it paves the way for studies of the dynamic interplay between the national
and international dimensions of naval architecture as a whole.
Systemic transformations are among the most thoroughly analysed topics in maritime
history. Historians have shown how radical transitions, such as the shift from wood to
steel, represented a systemic transformation that instantly nullified generations of experi-
ence and caused abrupt disconnections in organizational histories. As Larrie Ferreiro has
pointed out, the systemic revolution in shipbuilding materials was not a single innovation
but rather a deluge of interconnected inventions and improvements implemented in com-
mercial shipbuilding gradually over the course of a century.4 A worldwide systemic
1. R. Johnson, Guardians of the Sea: History of the United States Coast Guard, 1915 to the
Present (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1987).
2. Jorma Pohjanpalo, Talvimerenkulun Varhaisvaiheita: Suomen Talvimerenkulku 100 Vuotta
[100 years of Finnish Winter Navigation] (Helsinki, 1977).
3. Stig Tenold, ‘Constantly crossing borders: The international nature of maritime history’,
International Journal of Maritime History, 32 (2020), 412–3.
4. Larrie Ferreiro, Bridging the Seas: The Rise of Naval Architecture in the Industrial age,
1800–2000 (Cambridge, 2020), 80; Mikko Meronen, ‘Shipbuilding and engineering work-
shops in Turku 1800–1880’, in From Shipyards to the Seven Seas (Turku, 2018), 28–73;
Yrjö Kaukiainen, Ulos Maailmaan!: Suomalaisen merenkulun historia [Out to the world!:
The history of Finnish seafaring] (Helsinki, 2008), 158.
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change, taking place simultaneously at several locations, can hide the human faces behind
technological decision-making processes. How did risk-averse shipyards and naval archi-
tects come to adopt new technological solutions?
The transition from seagoing ships to ice-capable ships required a systemic change in
naval architecture, as the dynamic between a ship’s hull and ice follows natural laws other
than fluid dynamics and could not just be derived from earlier hydrodynamic studies and
experiments. While seagoing vessels had been systematically studied and developed using
model-scale and full-scale trials since the eighteenth century, the first ice-model testing facil-
ities did not open until the 1950s.5 No individual country or shipyard had the resources or
desire to independently embark on this novel branch of naval architecture before the
second half of the twentieth century. The lack of comprehensive theoretical understanding
of ice-going vessels and the small number of prototype icebreakers available globally
made icebreaker developments slow, risky and expensive. Therefore, international cooper-
ation and technology transfer became critical.
This article demonstrates the extent to which the development of seagoing icebreaking
vessels was the result of a transnational and evolutionary process. We name the ships
showcasing the developments, and leading engineers responsible for them, through the
selection and adaption of various technology transfer processes.6 This limited case
study allows us to identify the human faces and interactions behind the evolution of
polar ship technology and to increase understanding of the international and interdepen-
dent dimensions of maritime technological history.
To deconstruct the national narratives in the existing literature and construct a trans-
national interpretation of technology development, we study the continuities in material
artefacts. As George Basalla wrote in his 1988 study of technological development, ‘the
artefact – not scientific knowledge, nor the technical competence, nor social or economic
factors – is central to technology and technological change’.7 We focus on three key
vessels, the Swedish Ymer, the US ‘Wind’ class and the Finnish Voima, and trace the
development of three transformative technologies, hull shape, diesel–electric propulsion
and bow propellers. We focus on large, seagoing state-owned ships. While large and
small icebreakers are technologically intertwined, study of the latter would demand a dif-
ferent, typically municipal, set of sources and a different type of analysis. In addition,
icebreaking operations and ice conditions in ports, canals and riverways are different
from seagoing icebreaking operations and have called for a separate set of technologies,
such as ice plows or multifunctional icebreaking tugboats. Therefore, we leave the tech-
nological history of harbour and inland waterway icebreaking for future studies.
In the development of icebreakers, naval architects have recognized that ice is not just ice,
that ice formation and coverage significantly impact the performance of a certain type of ice-
breaker. For our story, the most important aspects of ice quality have to do with the difference
between multiyear polar ice – thick and hard fast ice – and the winter ice typical of the low-
salinity Baltic Sea or freshwater Great Lakes, which is not as thick or hard as polar ice, but
characterized by formations that hamper icebreaking – brash ice, ridged ice and drift ice.
5. Ferreiro, Bridging the Seas, 234–46.
6. Nathan Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technology (Cambridge, 1976), 173–88.
7. George Basalla, The Evolution of Technology (Cambridge, 1988), 30.
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Methodologically, we focus on the role of ‘technology carriers’. According to Lars
Olsson, college-educated engineers formed a social group that had both ‘the interest and
ability to bring forth, maintain, and develop technological systems’.8 This conceptualization
derives from the earlier use of the term ‘social carriers of techniques, first introduced by
Charles and Olle Edquist to examine technology transfer to developing countries9 and
later developed further by Henrik Björck to analyse the role of engineering newspapers in
technology dissemination.10While Olsson analysed the entire production system at shipyards
and identified management, the board of directors and owners as ‘system builders’,11 we in
contrast focus on technological solutions and hark back to the original definition proposed by
Edquist and Edquist that characterized the role of technology carriers in a more specific
manner. The original conceptualization draws attention to the choices made by actors in add-
ition to interest and ability:
• technology carriers need to have an ‘interest’ in choosing and implementing a spe-
cific technique;
• the entity must be ‘organized’ enough to be able to make a decision;
• it must have the necessary ‘social, economic, and political power’ to materialize its
interest;
• the social entity must have ‘information about the existence’ of the technique;
• it must have ‘access’ to the technique; and finally,
• it must ‘be able to acquire’ the needed knowledge on how to manage the
technique.12
This study is based on primary sources from diverse organizational archives, including
the US Coast Guard (USCG) archives in Washington, DC, the collections of Finnish
actors, ministries and maritime administration (MKH) in Helsinki and the archives of the
Swedish icebreaker service (SIS) in Stockholm. We also utilize other contemporary
sources of information available to the actors, such as engineering journals and conference
reports like the Swedish Teknisk Tidskrift and the American Proceedings for Civil
Engineers. To identify and show connections between different prototypes, we analyse tech-
nical drawings, model pictures and measurement tables of the existing icebreakers, and when
8. Lars Olsson, Technology Carriers: The Role of Engineers in the Expanding Swedish
Shipbuilding System (Gothenburg, 2000), 6.
9. Charles Edquist and Olle Edqvist, ‘Social carriers of techniques for development’, Journal of
Peace Research, 16 (1979), 313–31.
10. Henrik Björck, ‘Bilder av maskiner och ingenjörskårens bildande: Tekniska tidskrifter och
introdution av ny teknik i Sverige, 1800–1870’ [Builders of machines and the building of
the engineering core: Technology journals and the introduction of new technology into
Sweden, 1800–1870], Polhem, 5 (1987), 267–310.
11. Lars Olsson, Engineers as System Builders: The Rise of Engineers to Executive Positions in
Swedish Shipbuilding and the Industry’s Emergence as a Large Technological System, 1890–
1940 (Gothenburg, 1995), 21; Thomas Hughes, ‘The evolution of large technological
systems’, in The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the
Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, 1989), 51–82.
12. Edquist and Edqvist, ‘Social carriers of techniques for development’, 317.
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available, the original vessels. We start with a short primer on the early development of the
icebreaker before analysing the development of our subject ships.
The merger of the American and the European icebreaker
The idea of an ice-capable ship is older than that of a special-purpose icebreaking ship. It
emerged in various countries during the nineteenth century. Early prototypes differed in
appearance, but stemmed from the same origin: the introduction of steel hulls strong
enough to withstand the pressure of the ice, the development of steam engines powerful
enough to push the ship through ice and growing needs of global traders who no longer
had the patience to wait for the spring. From the 1830s onwards, major US ports used
small, reinforced paddle steamers to break ice. The British-built St Petersburg boat Pilot
(1864), along with the German tug Eisbrecher No. 1 (1871), were probably the first of a
type of ship later known as the ‘European icebreaker’. This vessel had a rotund, spoon-shaped
bow meant to climb atop the ice and crush it with the vessel’s weight. Numerous such ice-
breakers were built in the 1880s and 1890s in Germany, Denmark and Sweden for passage
through the Baltic Sea.13
Finland began to develop winter navigation ships after a horrendous famine in 1866–
1868.14 The first ice-going vessel, the package ship Expressen, was launched in 1877. Its
designer, Robert Runeberg (1846–1919), became a key technology carrier in the Baltic
region.15 In 1888–1889, he published a treatise on the technology of icebreaking ships
that featured a systemic examination of existing vessels and recognized the fundaments
of icebreaking.16 With Runeberg’s input, Finnish authorities decided to buy a new ice-
breaker from a Swedish shipyard. The icebreaker Murtaja (1890) copied European
designs, which were predominant at that time. As the most expensive ship in Finland,
it was greeted with immense expectations, but proved somewhat disappointing in use.
Murtaja’s blunt bow was inefficient and difficult to operate in the heavy pack-ice condi-
tions of the northern Baltic Sea.17
13. Christian von Ostersehlte, ‘Die Geschichte des Eisbrecherwesens im Überlick: von den
Anfängden und der Entwicklung des ersten Ausgereiften Eisbrechers in Hamburg bis zur
Gegenwart’ [The history of icebreaking: From the beginning and the development of the
first mature icebreaker in Hamburg to the present], Deutsches schiffahrtsarchiv, 9 (1983),
109–16.
14. The Grand Duchy of Finland was a self-governing part of the Russian Empire until December
1917.
15. Henrik Ramsay, Jääsaarron murtajat: Suomen talvimerenkulun historiaa [Breakers of Baltic
ice: The history of Finnish winter seafaring] (Porvoo, 1949), 86, 114–6.
16. Robert Runeberg, Minutes of Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Session
1888–89, part III, 279.
17. Robert Runeberg, ‘Om ångfartyg för vinterkommunikation och isbrytning’ [On steamers for
winter communications and icebreaking], Tekniska Föreningen i Finland Förhandlingar,
9 (1889); Saara Matala and Aaro Sahari, ‘Small nation, big ships: Winter navigation and tech-
nological nationalism in a peripheral country, 1878–1978’, History and Technology, 33
(2017), 222–5; Ramsay, Jääsaarron murtajat, 128–46; Jorma Ahvenainen, Suomen ulko-
maankauppa 1875–1975: erityisesti vientiä ja talviliikennettä silmällä pitäen [self-
published]. https://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/72663, 68–73, 79–85, 91–4.
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The problem stemming from the bow shape was resolved through transnational
cooperation between Finnish, Russian and American technology carriers. In 1893,
Runeberg presented a paper entitled The Possibility of Winter Navigation to
St. Petersburg before the Russian Imperial Technical Society, claiming that year-round
navigation to the Neva Estuary was technically possible. This encouraged Stepan
Makarov, a naval innovator and officer, to focus naval technology development on ice-
breakers. The country eventually ordered the large icebreaker Yermak from Armstrong,
Whitworth and Co. of Newcastle in 1897, together with a second Finnish icebreaker,
Sampo.18 Both ships were built with a diagonal, reinforced bow with a propeller under-
neath. This came to be known as the ‘American type’ of icebreaker.
The American-type icebreaking ship was developed for the Great Lakes by the naval
architect Frank E. Kirby (1849–1929) as a solution for the harsh wintry conditions in the
Mackinaw Sound. In 1888, he designed the ice-breaking railroad car ferry Ste. Ignace,
which had a propeller at both at bow and the stern.19 Kirby designed ferries for specific
routes, not specialized icebreakers. His invention was turned into a full-fledged icebreaker
only after Finnish technology carriers took note of it in 1896. Finland was preparing its
tender for the Sampo and sent out inquiries about novel developments. A Finnish-born ship-
builder in New York, Konstantin Jansson, replied with information on Kirby and his ships.
The Finnish Senate sent the master of theMurtaja, Leonard Melán, to the Great Lakes region
to find out more. He observed the ships and met with Kirby, who gave him technical speci-
fications to refine the tender for both the Sampo and Yermak (Figure 1).20
Cargo ships grew in size, which set new demands for icebreakers in the early decades of
the twentieth century. A third steam engine and a third propeller were added to the stern of
18. Robert Runeberg, ‘Steamers for winter navigation and ice-breaking’,Minutes of Proceedings
of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Vol. CXII, 1900; David Saunders, ‘Icebreakers in
Anglo-Russian relations (1914–21)’, The International History Review, 38 (2016), 814–29;
David Saunders, ‘Captain Wiggins and Admiral Makarov: Commerce and politics in the
Russian Arctic (1874–1904)’, The Polar Record, 53 (2017), 427–35; ‘На воду спущен
первый в мире ледокол «Ермак»’ [The world’s first icebreaker on the water, Yermak],
https://www.prlib.ru/history/619672 (accessed 4 March 2021); Matala and Sahari, ‘Small
nation, big ships’, 220–48.
19. ‘Marine Architect Frank E. Kirby’, http://www.boblosteamers.com/kirby.html (accessed 4
February 2021); ‘Frank E. Kirby’, http://www.michtranshist.info/pmwiki.php/Main/
FrankEKirby (accessed 4 February 2021); ‘Kirby, Frank E.’, https://detroithistorical.org/
learn/encyclopedia-of-detroit/kirby-frank-e (accessed 4 February 2021); ‘Detroit Dry Dock
Company’, https://detroithistorical.org/learn/encyclopedia-of-detroit/detroit-dry-dock-company
(accessed 4 February 2021).
20. L. Melan and K. Jansson, ‘Utlåtanden angående isbrytareångfartyg’ [Assessment of ice-
breaker steamships], Tekniska Föreningen i Finland Förhandlingar, 15, nos 2–3 (1895);
Konstantin Jansson, ‘Officielt meddelande till chefen för Handels- och
Industriexpeditionen I Kejserliga Senaten för Finland’ [Official communiqué to the chief of
the Finnish Trade and Industry andministration], Tekniska Föreningen i Finland
Förhandlingar, 15, nos 2–3 (1895); L. Melan, ‘Om de amerikanska isbrytare ångfartygen’
[On the American icebreaker steamship], Tekniska Föreningen i Finland Förhandlingar,
16, nos 1–2 (1896); Matala and Sahari, ‘Small nation, big ships’, 220–48.
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new icebreakers.21 The Russian ship Tsar Mikhail Feodorovich (1914) was built in Stettin
by AG Vulcan, then taken over by Finns during the Russian Revolution. Before it was
handed over to Estonia in 1922, Karl Albin Johansson, Finnish naval architect,22 measured
the hull. The MKH did not trust domestic shipyards to deliver a new Finnish icebreaker in
1924, but it trusted Johansson to draw up the technical specifications for the tender sub-
mitted for the next state icebreaker.23 The resulting icebreaker Jääkarhu (1925),
co-designed by Johansson and contractors at the Dutch shipyard P. Smit Jr, was the
largest and strongest icebreaker in the world at the time of its launch.24 It became an integral
precursor to the design of the world’s first diesel–electric icebreaker.
Figure 1. Icebreaker Wäinämöinen (formerly Tsar Mikhail Feodorovich, later renamed Suur Tõll) at
Suomenlinna dock around 1920, showing the ‘American-type’ bow.
Source: Finnish National Archives, Pilot and Lighthouse Administration, Icebreakers, Uaaa:3012.
21. Helsinki, Kansallisarkisto (Finnish National Archive, hereafter KA), Henrik Ramsay private
archive, 21, Karl Albin Johansson to Henrik Ramsay in a memorandum, most likely from 1947.
22. Johansson had begun his technology studies at the Finnish Polytechnical Institute, but he
moved to Sweden in 1904 to escape being conscripted into the Russian military. He graduated
as a naval architect in 1906 from Chalmers University of Technology, one of the leaders in the
field at that time. With his international experience and top-quality education, Johansson
became the next central technology expert on Finnish winter navigation after Runeberg.
23. Aaro Sahari, Valtio ja suurteollisuuden synty [The state and the making of big industry]
(Helsinki, 2018), 95–101.
24. Sahari, Valtio ja suurteollisuuden synty, 101–22.
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The early 1920s also witnessed the beginnings of ice classifications for commercial
vessels by various classification societies. Finland developed new regulations for
ships in 1920, adding language regarding their ice-going capabilities in 1924.
Since the country had no national classification societies, it relayed these develop-
ments to all relevant organizations, such as Lloyd’s, Det Norske Veritas and
Germanischer Lloyd. A later Finnish regulation was harmonized further with those
of other Nordic countries as information exchange between state maritime authorities
was formalized.25 The development of ice classifications intensified in the 1950s
between Finland and Sweden, leading to a joint Baltic system in the 1970s.
However, this falls beyond the scope of this article, despite the shared feature of trans-
national expert networks.
Transnational cooperation in the interwar period
We turn our attention now to the namesake of the mythological parent of giants, Ymer.
The harbour of the Swedish capital Stockholm freezes over in a typical winter. Cities
further north on the Swedish Baltic coast face even harsher ice conditions and the
Swedish icebreaker service was tied to the industrialization of Norrland at the time.
When the First World War disrupted trade, the government set up a committee to
explore the economic and logistical outlook for industrial expansion northwards.
Sweden would need stronger icebreakers to keep the Norrland coast open throughout
the year. Swedish shipbuilding had developed rapidly around the turn of the century,
with shipyards copying and building European-type icebreakers from the 1870s
onwards. In particular, the Malmö shipyard of Kockums Mekaniska Werkstad com-
peted on Nordic markets by building icebreakers for Danish, Norwegian and domestic
buyers, most notably completing the HMS Svensksund in 1891 for the Swedish state. It
was an icebreaking naval vessel with a transitional sharp bow shape, but without the
bow propeller.26
Swedish shipbuilders followed recent trends in international icebreaking. After
Finland had commissioned the Sampo, Swedish actors took note of its experiences
with the ‘American’ bow. The Swedish naval architect Axel Lindblad released a
widely read treatise on icebreaker construction in 1912. His theoretical insights were
mostly based on Runeberg’s treatise and the findings of the Finnish winter navigation
commission of 1896, written in Swedish. Lindblad codified the nomenclature on the
‘American-type’ icebreakers to mean the shape of the bow and the existence of the
bow propeller. He paid no attention to the aforementioned point that Kirby’s ships
were actually ferries, not purpose-built icebreakers. Since the book was easily available
in Germany and Denmark, it had a marked influence on icebreaker construction in the
southern Baltic Sea region in the years to come. Icebreakers like the Danish Storebjørn
25. Yrjö Kaukiainen and Pirkko Leino-Kaukiainen, Navigare necesse [History of the Finnish
Maritime Authority] (Helsinki, 1992), 74–8.
26. Axel Lindblad, Om isbrytarefartyg och deras konstruktion [On icebreakers and their con-
struction] (Stockholm, 1912), 1–17; K.E. Palmén, Om isbrytareångfartyg och vintersjöfart
[On icebreaking steamers and winter seafaring] (Helsingfors, 1894), 53–5.
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(1931) and German Stettin (1933) are good examples of this regional development in
steam icebreakers (Figure 2).27
The first Swedish sea-going icebreaker was built for the city of Stockholm by the local
Finnboda shipyard in 1915. Initially named Isbrytaren II, the Sankt Erik was a full expres-
sion of an ‘American’ icebreaker, with the bow angle and shape copied from the Finnish
icebreaker Tarmo (and via it from Sampo).28 A critical instigator in this process was the
Stockholm parliamentary representative Sven Lübeck, a waterway engineer with connec-
tions throughout the Nordic countries. He understood the role of electrical power in indus-
trialization and supported the domestic shipbuilding of naval vessels. As Mats Fridlund,
historian of technology, has pointed out, this was the period of strategic system building
in Swedish electrical engineering and technological networks.29
Figure 2. A concept drawing of the development and angle of the icebreaker bow.
Source: KA, HR, 21. The drawing dates from the 1940s during the design of icebreaker Voima. It was digitized,
digitally rearranged and enhanced by Aaro Sahari.
27. Christian Ostersehlte to the authors in 2017; Ramsay, Jääsaarron murtajat, 448–66; Staffan
Fischerström, Isbrytare: med statens isbrytare under 80 år [Icebreakers: with the state’s ice-
breakers for 80 years] (Falkenberg, 1997), 12–3; Kockums 150 Years: 1840–1990 (Malmö,
1990).
28. We visited both ships in Stockholm and in Kotka. Klas Helmerson, ‘Isbrytaren II – Sankt Erik
– en årskronika’ [Icebreaker II – St Erik – chronicle], in Sankt Erik: isbrytare och museiån-
gare [Saint Erik: Icebreaker and museum steamship] (Stockholm, 1995); Fischerström,
Isbrytare, 13–4; Ramsay, Jääsaarron murtajat, 451.
29. Stockholm, Krigsarkivet (Swedish Military Archives, hereafter KRA), Marinförvaltningen,
Nautiska avdelningen, FI:i Handlingar ang. isbrytarverksamhet, Kungl. Maj.ts proposition
Nr. 156 March 19 1924; ‘Sven E J Lübeck’ (1984) https://sok.riksarkivet.se/sbl/
Presentation.aspx?id=9944; ‘Nordisk Familjebok, Svenska pansarbåtsföreningen’ (1918),
http://runeberg.org/nfcg/0554.html; Fischerström, Isbrytare, 16; Mats Fridlund, Den gemen-
samma utvecklingen: staten, storföretaget och samarbetet kring den svenska elkrafttekniken
[Joint development: State, big industry, and the collaboration on Swedish electrical technol-
ogy] (Stockholm, 1999), 88–117.
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Icebreaking was a public service in Finland. Sweden adopted the same position
after the Norrland Committee advocated a state-run service over private commercial
operators. In 1924, the Swedish Parliament approved the purchase of a second large
icebreaker, the Stats-isbrytaren (1926, renamed Atle in the 1930s).30 With this ship,
the Swedish state icebreaking service as a joint military and civilian service began to
take form. Operating at the state level helped with information gathering and policy
formulation, as Swedish officials saw Finland and Denmark as natural partners, which
increased the scientific, technical and operational exchange of information. As a
result, Nordic winter navigation regulations were mostly harmonized from 1928
onwards.31
The two Swedish icebreakers soon proved to be insufficient for maritime traffic
along the Swedish Baltic coast, and Norrland industries, together with maritime and
shipbuilding interests, lobbied hard for a third state icebreaker.32 The idea of overcom-
ing winter conditions with technology had won over key advocates in Sweden. The
winters preceding the global depression of the 1930s were notably hard in the Baltic
Sea region, and Finnish icebreakers were used to help convoys pass the Danish
Sound in 1929. Danish and Swedish officials negotiated with the USSR for the loan
of the IB Lenin. This provided an opportunity for the Soviet state to accumulate
foreign currencies since the payment was handled in UK Sterling.33 Together, the lob-
bying combined with the harsh winters to persuade the Swedish state to start a new-
build programme.
Finnish icebreakers were used as proof in Swedish intra-governmental memoranda for
building stronger, rather than larger, icebreakers, as the passages along the Gulf of
Bothnia were often shallow. The director of the shipping company Svea, Björn von
Sydow, was a crucial member of the icebreaker lobby in Sweden and one of the builders
of cross-Baltic shipping lines together with the key Finnish actor, FÅA director Henrik
Ramsay. Naval architect O.R. von Sydow – his cousin – was tasked with designing
three new icebreakers based on the tested dimensions and hull lines of the newest
30. Fischerström, Isbrytare, 17–25.
31. Stockholm, Riksarkivet (Swedish National Archives, hereafter RA), Sjöfartsbyrån,
Isbrytardirektören (hereafter SID), F:2 Ämnesordnade handlingar, memoranda and interna-
tional treaties regarding icebreaking cooperation; Redogärelse för Sveriges statliga isbryt-
ningsverksamhet 1926–1934 [Report on state icebreaking 1926–1934] (Stockholm, 1935);
‘Kunglika Majestets reglemente för statens isbrytarfartyg’ [The Royal Majesty’s rules for
state icebreakers], SFS no. 364/28.
32. Fischerström, Isbrytare, 40; Sahari, Valtio ja suurteollisuuden synty, 95–122.
33. ‘Isbrytarverksamheten vid rikets södra och västra kusten år 1929’ [Icebreaker service on the
state’s (Sweden) southern and western coast in 1929], Kommersiella Meddelanden, 9 (1929);
KRA, Marinförvaltningen, Nautiska avdelningen, FI:i Handlingar ang. isbrytarverksamhet,
Kungl. Maj:ts proposition 234, 14 March 1930; RA, Sjöfartsbyrån, SID, F:2
Ämnesordnade handlingar, copy of the English translation of the contract between the
Danish Ministry of Industry, Swedish government, and a trade delegation from the USSR
with related Swedish memoranda, Danish Maritime Authority’s report ‘Den finske stats –
isbryder “Sampo’s” virksomhed under den danske Regering Vinteren 1929’ on the hiring
of the Finnish IB Sampo for the winter of 1928–1929.
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Finnish icebreaker, Jääkarhu.34 Two of von Sydow’s designs followed the ship with
respect to propulsion, featuring oil-fired steam engines. The third plan was far more
expensive and experimental, as it featured diesel–electric engines. At the time, Finnish
civil maritime authorities had no interest in risking untested diesel–electric propulsion
for icebreakers. Their expertise was in traditional steam propulsion, and they were
typical maritime actors, cautious and conservative in the face of novel technological solu-
tions (Figure 3).35
The Swedish icebreaker innovations occurred in tandem with development of the nation’s
electrical technology policy. ASEA was a national technological jewel with close ties to gov-
ernment officials, and as such, it could inform development in other industries.36 The com-
pany’s technical chief engineer, Ragnar Liljeblad, gave a speech on icebreakers to Swedish
shipbuilding engineers in 1930, where he stressed the following points:
What are we waiting for? Where would one build a larger icebreaker with diesel–electric drive
than in Sweden? Will we beg that England or Germany, who don’t need such vessels, would
give it a go? Our technical reputation demands that we do not trod familiar paths without criti-
cism, but that we here in Sweden can take the lead, when development calls for it.37
While the electrical engineering industry wanted to push forward with the plan, the
Swedish government hesitated. The Board of Trade (under the Foreign Ministry) asked
for expert testimonials on the performance of diesel–electric propulsion in icebreaking.
The Royal Swedish Naval Materiel Administration (Marinförvaltningen) meanwhile sup-
ported the technological innovation. Naval officers invoked American experience with
the ice-capable cutter USCGC Northland (1927) as an important example of the benefits
of diesel–electric drive. Although recognizing that the cutter was not a full icebreaker,
they still used it as an example in support of the new propulsion system in cold conditions.
As the next section shows, this point was later evidently somewhat inflated by Edward
H. Thiele, when he justified acquiring new icebreakers for the USCG (Figure 4).38
34. KRA, Marinförvaltningen, Nautiska avdelningen, FI:I, Kungl. Maj.ts proposition Nr. 156, 19
March 1924, and Kungl. Maj:ts proposition 234, 14 March 1930; KA, Henrik Ramsay, 5 I
Kamp med Östersjöns isar -teos, FÅA director Ramsay’s personal archive has traces of
close connection between his company and Svea.
35. Sahari, Valtio ja suurteollisuuden synty, 150–3; Gard Paulsen et al., Building Trust: The
History of DNV 1864–2014 (Dinamo, 2014), 73–4.
36. Mats Fridlund, Den gemensamma utvecklingen: staten, storföretaget och samarbetet kring
den svenska elkrafttekniken (Symposion, 1999), 215–20.
37. Ragnar Liljeblad, ‘Dieselelektrisk drift av fartyg med speciell hänsyn till isbrytare’, Tekniska
samfundets handlingar, 4 (1930), 1–13. Quote: ‘Vad väntar vi egentligen på? Var skall man
för resten bygga en större isbrytare med diesel-elektriskt maskineri, om ej i Sverige? Skola vi
begära, att England eller Tyskland, som ej behöva sådanna fartyg, skola gå i spetsen? Vårt
tekniska anseende fordrar, att vi här ej kritiklöst trampa på i de gamla fotspåren utan
alltjämt visa, att vi här i Sverige kunna gå i spetsen, när utvecklingen så fordrar’.
38. Washington, DC, United States Coast Guard Archive (hereafter USCG), box 201D, Edward
Thiele, ‘Machinery installations of the “Wind” class Coast Guard Icebreakers’, Presentation
in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, paper 48-A.111, 1948.
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There was tacit understanding that the state icebreaker should be built at a domestic
shipyard, even if the Swedish government asked for offers from abroad. Swedish ship-
yards were forerunners in the ongoing major transformation in shipbuilding, having
already started to build motorized ships with engines from local machinery works.
Swedish electrical and shipbuilding industries were strongly in favour of a move
towards increased use of diesel–electric propulsion in demanding conditions. The final
point of emphasis, however, was economic. Diesel-electric propulsion was projected to
be cheaper to operate than steam, largely owing to fuel and manning costs.39
In 1931, the Swedish state struck a deal with Kockums Shipyard in Malmö for a
6,000-shaft horsepower (SHP), three-propeller icebreaker. Upon launch in 1933, the
Ymer40 was the most cost-efficient Swedish state icebreaker to operate, and thus, the
first deployed in any given winter.41 It had a single bow propeller and two aft propellers.
The bow shape was based on Finnish icebreakers from the 1920s, and Finnish officials
from MKH had provided the necessary data. As a reward, they were then welcomed to
study Ymer’s performance in 1936, when Finland began planning its first diesel–electric
icebreaker, Sisu (1939).42
The master of the Ymer, Stellan Hermelin, was promoted to direct the icebreaker
service during the Second World War. He had formulated a plan for a more systematic
Figure 3. Comparison of the hull dimensions of specific icebreakers. Note the similarity between
the Swedish ship Ymer and the Finnish, Rotterdam-built Jääkarhu.
Source: Gustaf Halldin, ‘Statsisbrytaren “Ymer”’, Teknisk Tidskrift, January 1932.
39. KRA, Marinförvaltningen, Nautiska avdelningen, FI:i, Kungl. Maj:ts proposition 234, 14
March 1930.
40. The titan was first mentioned in Snorri Sturluson’s epic Edda: see Fischerström, Isbrytare, 8.
41. Havsisbrytaren Ymer [Ymer building contract between the Swedish state and Kockums
Shipyard] (Kungliga Marinförvaltningen, Stockholm, 1931); Fischerström, Isbrytare, 43–5;
KRA, Marinförvaltningen, Nautiska avdelningen, FI:i, budget proposals for state icebreaker
1932–1935.
42. Sahari, Valtio ja suurteollisuuden synty, 153, 156–7.
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and international winter navigation policy with enduring knowledge transfer between
public officials in icebreaking countries and new ice classifications for ships to reduce
the risks of winter traffic. Finland was the obvious collaborator, and by 1955 Swedish
and Finnish maritime officials had developed direct and uncomplicated relations with
one another.43 These connections were crucial for Finnish post-war efforts at developing
a four-propeller icebreaker, a subject examined in the last empirical section. Before that,
we need to examine icebreaker development throughout the northern Atlantic.
Transatlantic connections
The USCG cutter Storis (WMEC-38) was a light icebreaking cutter that patrolled mainly
in Arctic waters from 1941 to 2007. She had a remarkably long career for a coast guard
cutter, but the first thing that drew our attention was her name, which deviated from the
naming tradition of the USCG. Storis was neither a name nor a place, but rather a mis-
spelling of the Scandinavian words ‘stor is’, meaning great ice. Next, we will focus on
the connections between the USCG and Scandinavian countries, which were fundamental
to the development of the longest icebreaker class ever in the US, the ‘Wind’ class. This
Figure 4. Icebreaker Ymer in the 1960s.
Source: Lars Rutenius, Sjöhistoriska Museet, Fo258703DIA, CC BY SA.
43. RA, Sjöfartsbyrån, SID, E1:10 Diarieförda skrivelser, letters between key actors; ‘Betänkande
med förslag till ordnande av statens isbrytningsverksamhet’, Statens offentliga utredningar,
53 (1942); Hans Blenner and Bengt Ohrelius, Isbrytare (Hörsta Förlag, 1960), 34–5.
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transnational connection also laid the foundation for US–Swedish information exchange
that benefited both Finland and the USSR.
In the Nordic countries, icebreaking was established as a state-owned public service
based on special purpose vessels. In the US, icebreaking vessels were classified as pri-
vately operated train and passenger ferries, or as governmental multipurpose cutters.
The principal state authority in the US contributing to icebreaker development in the
first half of the twentieth century was the USCG since it needed ice-capable cutters to
enforce the law at high latitudes, to supply remote communities and, occasionally, to
assist in winter navigation (Figure 5).44
The existing literature provides only limited information about the development
process of the USCG polar cutters or their ice capability. A diverse set of functionality,
low national priority and lack of systematic research and development contributed to the
US falling behind northern European development efforts in designing dedicated, steel-
hulled icebreakers with overpowered engines. The first attempt to build a dedicated polar
vessel was the aforementioned cutter Northland, the design of which was based on a
Figure 5. USCG officer E. Thiele’s notes from Scandinavia.
Note: According to these diagrams, Thiele understood the main difference between the ‘European’ and
‘American’ type of icebreaker as having to do with the bow propeller, while in Europe, the ‘American type’
referred to the adoption of a sharp cut bow instead of a spoon-shaped one. In the 1930s, at the time of Thiele’s
trip, the centre of development for ‘American-type’ icebreakers was the Baltic Sea region, while Thiele’s notion
of a ‘European-type’ icebreaker corresponded best with Russian polar icebreakers
Source. USCG Archive, box 201D.
44. Harvey F. Johnson, ‘Development of Ice-breaking Vessels for the U.S. Coast Guard’, The
Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, 3 (1946).
Sahari and Matala 735
survey among officers with varying levels of Arctic experience. Developmental projects
based on past experience tend to lean towards the conservative side. When the intervie-
wees recommended auxiliary sails in case of ice damage far away in Arctic waters, the
Northland ended up as a curious combination of an older shipbuilding tradition incorpor-
ating sails and the newest technology in shipbuilding, single-screw, diesel–electric pro-
pulsion. As the first steel-hulled USCG polar vessel, it ultimately proved that the
conventional wisdom – that only a wooden hull has the flexibility to survive the pressure
of the ice – was outdated. Otherwise, the ‘most expensive USCG acquisition’ proved a
disappointment: underpowered in the Arctic ice, inefficient at icebreaking and difficult
to handle. From the point of view of icebreaking history, the Northland was an ice-
capable vessel instead of an icebreaker. Its faults laid the groundwork for a more systema-
tic approach by the USCG to developing the next line of icebreakers.
The need for a full-fledged icebreaker in US waterways emerged in the 1930s as the
result of an increased need for oil heating in large cities. Heating oil, unlike coal, could
not be stored in unlimited quantities, meaning that it needed to be shipped throughout the
winter. In 1933, Congress authorized the construction of an icebreaking cutter for the
Hudson River. As a reflection of the urgency of the task, on 21 December 1936,
President Roosevelt directed the USCG by executive order to assist with navigation
and keeping navigational routes, channels and harbours open. The executive order
gave icebreaking added importance, but it did not include any extra funds for research
and development. According to USCG historian, R.E. Johnson, the problem was that
‘no one in the Coast Guard seemed to have known how to design an icebreaker’.45
The faults with the in-house design of the Northland, together with the lack of resources
to develop icebreaking expertise from scratch, motivated the USCG to gather available
information from abroad as cost efficiently as possible.
The officer who was tasked with the transfer of icebreaking expertise from Scandinavia
to the US was Edward H. Thiele (1905–1981). He had no previous expertise in polar navi-
gation and was not even a naval architect by training, but instead an electrical engineer and
a swimming coach at the Coast Guard Academy. He was married to a Danish woman
though. Moreover, he happened to be in Copenhagen when the US icebreaking project
was launched, sparing the USCG from having to pay his travel costs. Thiele’s European
leave was thus interrupted by an order to visit the northern European countries of
Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Latvia and the Netherlands to study their icebreaker
designs and record the dimensions of the hulls, details of the bow shape and any informa-
tion about propulsion systems and propeller constellations.46
In particular, Thiele focused on the Swedish ship Ymer. R.E. Johnson notes that ‘the
head of the Swedish icebreaking service must have been amused when he explained that
she combined the bow form of the Great Lakes car ferry Ste. Marie with Quincy
B. Newman’s diesel–electric drive’. While Johnson gave some credit to Swedish engi-
neers for the quality of the ship’s design, he determinedly overlooked the technological
developments having taken place overseas during the previous 50 years by accrediting
the car ferry’s trivial act of driving backwards in the Great Lakes in the 1880s with the
45. Johnson, Guardians of the Sea, 155.
46. USCG, box 201, USCG icebreaker cutters.
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origin of modern icebreaking: ‘the basic information that Thiele sought [in Scandinavia]
was readily available in the United States!’47
After returning to the US, Thiele participated in the design of the USCG’s new iceb-
reaking cutters, the class of four, 110-foot-long harbour tugs. Based on Scandinavian
information (Table 1), the USCG Raritan (1939) and her sister ships had stronger hulls
and more powerful diesel–electric engines than their predecessors. In the winter of
1940, they proved successful in breaking the ice on the Hudson River, under the types
of conditions they had been designed for.48
Later in the spring of 1940, with Germany occupying Denmark and the US State
Department requesting that the USCG help protect Greenland’s sovereignty, the focus
of the USCG icebreaker project switched from coastal and inland waters to the Arctic.
The Northland, Raritan and several other USCG ice-capable cutters joined the
Greenland patrol, but none of them was a full-fledged polar icebreaker capable of break-
ing a navigable route for other surface vessels through multiyear polar ice. In 1941, Thiele
returned to USCG headquarters, where he received an order from Treasury Secretary
Morgenthau to build ‘the world’s greatest icebreakers’.49
Wartime Arctic operations laid out a new set of requirements: ice worthiness claimed
priority, while seakeeping qualities were of secondary importance. Longer cruising
ranges called for the utmost fuel economy, as ships had to be self-sustaining for a
period of one year if caught in the ice. The ships’ machinery had to be capable of operat-
ing with outside ambient temperatures as low as −50°F. Thiele recalled afterwards that
the issuing of power requirements in lieu of hull strength and space limitations
‘sounded more like submarine practice than any other type of ship’.50
The process of advancing from transnational survey to the construction of the ‘Wind’ class
icebreakers was described in detail in a presentation by USCG Rear Admiral Harvey Johnson
before the Society of Naval Architects andMarine Engineering in 1946.51 Even if the USwas
aiming to develop a polar icebreaker at the time, the most important design solutions origi-
nated in the Baltic Sea region: ‘the outstandingly successful Swedish icebreaker Ymer offered
the closest approximation to the problem in hand, in that considerable power was installed in
a ship of relatively short length, and it served as a prototype for the development of the
Northwind-class vessels’.52 Based on the survey, the ‘Wind’ class icebreakers became rela-
tively short in proportion to engine power and beam. TheUSCGWind had a hull length of 82
metres and was 19.4metres wide, while the Ymerwas 78.6 metres long and 19.3 metres wide.
The ‘Wind’ class vessels were equipped with three propellers driven by 10,000 SHP, which
again was close to the 9,900 SHP for the Ymer (Figure 6).
The USCG adopted the overpowered diesel–electric drive, powerful heeling tanks, main
dimensions and power ratio from the Ymer, but their response to bow propellers – proven to
47. Johnson, Guardians of the Sea, 157.
48. Johnson, Guardians of the Sea, 158.
49. Cited in Johnson, Guardians of the Sea, 214.
50. USCG, box 201D, 1772, 84, Edward Thiele, ‘Machinery installations of the “Wind” class
Coast Guard Icebreakers’.
51. Johnson, ‘Development of Ice-breaking Vessels’.
52. Johnson, ‘Development of Ice-breaking Vessels’.
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be superior on the Baltic Sea – was problematic when accounting for polar conditions. The
USCG had physically examined only one icebreaker designed for polar waters, the Soviet
Krasin, which the USSR had agreed to lend in exchange for assistance in 1941. The Krasin
spent four months in Seattle and was thoroughly examined, even if retrospective American
accounts diminish its role in new US icebreaker design. For example, Johnson cites Thiele:
‘[b]ut, good lord, it was a 1917 design … this was ancient history at its best’.53
Thiele’s survey relayed information on other Soviet polar icebreakers: the J. Stalin
(renamed Sibir), Alexander Nevskiy and Stepan Makarov. While it is unclear how the
USCG acquired this information, the Soviet Union’s negative experience with bow pro-
pellers in Artic ice conditions appears to be the main evidence on which both Johnson and
Thiele based their arguments on the issue.54 The full-scale ‘Wind’ class icebreakers were
equipped with detachable bow propellers that were seldom used in Arctic waters. The
USCG Mackinac (WAGB-83) had three propellers like the Ymer – two aft and one
forward. It was essentially a scaled-down version of the ‘Wind’ designed for the Great
Lakes, where the ice conditions corresponded with those of the Baltic Sea.
By the end of the Second World War, icebreaker-building nations had acquired a basic
understanding that sea ice was not just ice: conditions differed on various seas and
various icebreaker designs were required. The science and technology of icebreaking
was still in its infancy and lacked accurate descriptions and mathematical forms that
could be used to test new innovative design ideas before ship construction. The last
empirical section on the Finnish icebreaker Voima examines the culmination of ice-
breaker bow propeller developments before the era of model-scale experiments.
Figure 6. USCG Mackinaw, a smaller version of the Wind class icebreakers designed for
operations in the Great Lakes.
Source: Harvey F. Johnson, ‘Development of Ice-breaking Vessels for the U.S. Coast Guard’, The Society of Naval
Architects and Marine Engineers, 3 (1946).
53. Johnson, ‘Development of Ice-breaking Vessels’.
54. Johnson, ‘Development of Ice-breaking Vessels’; USCG, box 201D, 1772, 84, Edward
Thiele, ‘Machinery installations of the “Wind” class Coast Guard Icebreakers’.
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State-supported risk-taking
After the Second World War, it was evident to Finnish icebreaker technology experts that
the bow propeller was effective in breaking ice on the northern Baltic Sea. The single bow
propeller situated on the ship’s centre line, however, had an adverse effect: a sideward
movement that pushed the ship against one side of the ice barrier and increased friction.
Solving this problem became critical when Finland lost two of its three newest ice-
breakers, Jääkarhu and Voima (1924), to the USSR as war reparations, leaving
Finnish exports bereft of icebreaker assistance.
The government established a committee to plan the purchase of a new large icebreaker in
January 1946.55 The committee was chaired by theMinistry of Trade and Industry’s maritime
affairs director, Rear Admiral Svante Sundman. Hewas the personification of the state–indus-
try nexus. Besides his other duties, he oversaw naval liaisons with the USSR and was named
director of the war reparations administration ‘Soteva’ in 1948. Karl Albin Johansson was
again asked to design the tender specifications for the next generation of icebreaker. The
end-user organization, MKH, was led by Sundman’s former navy colleague, Admiral Eero
Rahola, who was not without important connections either. His younger brother was
Jaakko Rahola, Professor of Shipbuilding at Helsinki University of Technology and the
chief of Soteva’s shipbuilding department. All key positions in Finnish maritime and ship-
building affairs were both militarized and manned by well-connected individuals of known
quantity during the postwar years.56
The icebreaker committee took a study trip to Stockholm aboard the Swedish ice-
breaker Ymer in March 1946. They went through every detail of the ship, met with
leading Swedish experts and received a wealth of technical and in-use information,
including all of the changes made to the Ymer in an overhaul in 1945. During these
talks, the possibility of including two bow propellers was raised. The Swedish were in
favour of this idea, which had the potential to increase efficiency in pack ice. The
Ymer, with its single bow propeller, had to back into heavy ice formations, a slow and
fuel-consuming operation. Johansson was convinced that the slightly sleeker Ymer was
more powerful than the Jääkarhu had been.57 However, he disagreed on the benefits
of two bow propellers and was able to turn Sundman to his view. Technical drawings
in support of the committee report, drawn by Johansson, show a traditional three-
propeller icebreaker of slightly larger dimensions than the Ymer (see Figure 7).58
55. Helsinki, Eduskunnan kirjasto (Library of the Finnish Parliament, hereafter EK),
Parliamentary committee reports, 1947:37, Jäänsärkijätoimikunnan mietintö [Icebreaker
committee report], 3 March 1947.
56. Sahari, Valtio ja suurteollisuuden synty, passim.
57. Kotka, Suomen merimuseo (Finnish Maritime Museum, hereafter SMM), Karl Albin
Johansson archive (hereafter KAJ), A97004: 064, copy of committee fact finding mission
report and dossier, ‘Två förpropellrar diskussion’, collected by Johansson.
58. SMM, KAJ, A97004: piirustukset, Johansson’s original concept plans and drawings for
Finnish state icebreaker in 1946; Jäänsärkijätoimikunnan mietintö; SMM, KAJ, A97004:
064, Hermelin memorandum ‘PM angående propellerutrustning och vissa egenskaper hos
isbrytare’, 7 October 1948 and Johansson’s report, 18 February 1948; Sahari, Valtio ja suur-
teollisuuden synty, 328.
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The Swedish icebreaking officials had received word from Canada that a new iceb-
reaking train ferry had just been completed. The M/V Abegweit had two bow propellers
that rotated in opposing directions and diminished friction on both sides of the hull. While
Johansson argued that conditions at Prince Edward Island Sound differed from those in
the Gulf of Finland, and that the ferry did not prove the feasibility of the novel propeller
placement, Hermelin believed that Finland should test the idea. Sweden, too, was prepar-
ing to build new icebreakers, and Swedish officials were interested in how various
designs, ranging from the ‘Wind’ class polar icebreakers without bow propellers to the
Abegweit with two propellers, would behave. To press the issue, Hermelin sent materials
on the Canadian ship directly to Director Sundman.59
Figure 7. K.A. Johansson’s concept drawing of a Finnish state icebreaker in late 1946, with only
one bow propeller.
Note: Johansson wanted to name the ship Into, meaning ardour, but he was later overruled.
Source: Maritime Museum of Finland (FMM), KAJ, A97004: piirustukset; picture by Taru Laakkonen, FMM, used
with their permission.
59. SMM, KAJ, A97004: 064, Qvistgaard to Sundman; RA, Sjöfartsbyrån, SID, F:1
Ämnesordnade handlingar, 3 June 1946 memorandum ‘Några synpunkter på en havsisbry-
tares propellarutrustning’.
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The MKH initially sided with Johansson in 1946, but prior to the release of the com-
mission’s report Eero Rahola changed his mind and sent Sundman a new letter pleading
with the ministry to consider two bow propellers. Still, the final committee report omitted
this opinion. In 1947, Finland was to complete a ship that was slightly larger but techno-
logically quite similar ship to the Ymer. Fortunately for MKH and Hermelin, the Finnish
state did not have enough funds to order the new icebreaker, and the propeller debate
could continue.60
Stellan Hermelin travelled to the US and Canada in March 1948 to investigate the pro-
peller issue further. His naval background may have helped him in forming connections
with the USCG. In New York, he met with USCG officials and visited the USCG
Eastwind. Then he travelled to Washington, DC and USCG headquarters, where a
meeting was arranged with a USCG commander, Admiral Joseph F. Farley, Captain
Thiele, who had become head of the technical department, and many others. From
Washington, Hermelin continued to shipyards in Detroit and Toledo and visited the
USCG Mackinaw. He crossed the border into Canada to meet with St Lawrence
Seaway chief engineer Maynard Metcalf, who was in charge of operations pertaining
to the Abegweit. Finally, Hermelin visited the shipyard where the ferry had been built
and met with its designers. Hermelin acquired numerous documents during his trip,
which he promptly sent to Finland.61
Hermelin was convinced that a two-bow propeller constellation for an icebreaker was
not only feasible, but far superior to the extant single-screw design. His trip led to a reap-
praisal of the Finnish committee’s findings. The Finnish electrical engine manufacturing
company Ab Gottfr. Strömberg Oy, which had built the machinery for the prewar Finnish
icebreaker Sisu and was in line to provide machinery for the new ship as well, asked
Professor Jaakko Rahola to evaluate the issue anew after the ministry had downplayed
Hermelin’s findings. While committee specialist Johansson was the preeminent ice-


















60. SMM, KAJ, A97004: piirustukset, Johansson’s original plans; Sahari, Valtio ja suurteollisuu-
den synty, 331–3.
61. SMM, KAJ, A97004: 064, SID Stellan Hermelin’s ‘Rapport om studieresa i USA och Canada
ang. isbrytare och isbrytarverksamhet’; Stellan Hermelin, ‘En eller två förpropellrar på isbry-
tare?’ Teknisk Tidskrift, 47 (1948); KA, Merenkulkuhallitus (Finnish Maritime Authority,
hereafter MKH), II arkisto, Eb:387 Saapuneet asiakirjat, SID Stellan Hermelin to MKH, 14
December 1946.
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Finland. Strömberg directors insisted that ‘it would be a great defeat for our country to
leave the sea-going icebreaker with just one bow propeller’. Professor Rahola sided
with the manufacturer, arguing that ‘theoretically speaking, the move from one to two
bow propellers would lead to a significant increase in icebreaking capacity’. He argued
that Finnish and Swedish tests on reversing icebreakers against ice formations had
proved that the concept was sound.62
Even the projected builder, Wärtsilä Helsinki Shipyard, seemed to side with MKH,
Strömberg and Professor Rahola. Thus, when almost everyone around him had shifted
in support of two-bow propellers, Johansson was left with no room to manoeuvre.
When Wärtsilä’s design department eventually drew the actual construction plans, the
icebreaker Voima had its two bow propellers.63
Figure 8. In 1954, the icebreaker Voima jumpstarted the Finnish icebreaker technology cluster
that made Wärtsilä Shipyard (Helsinki) a nexus of Arctic knowledge.
Source: Niilo Aljasalo for Wärtsilä, Maritime Museum of Finland, SMK88001:470, CC BY 4.0.
62. SMM, KAJ, A97004: 064, Strömberg’s letter to KTM, 26 Aug1948, Ragnar Enberg from
Strömberg to KTM, 31 Jan 1948 and Professor Rahola memorandum ‘Lausunto keulapotkur-
ien lukumäärän vaikutuksesta jäänmurtajan eräisiin ominaisuuksiin’ [Statement on the effect
of two bow propellers to certain features of the icebreaker], 15 August 1948; Ferreiro,
Bridging the Seas, 181–4.
63. SMM, KAJ, A97004: 064, Jan Erik Jansson (evidently 1951), ‘Den nya havsisbrytare – ett
teknikens framsteg’ [Wärtsilä Shipyard Director Jansson: The new sea-going icebreaker –
a technicians view]; Sahari, Valtio ja suurteollisuuden synty, 336.
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In 1955, Sweden ordered its largest icebreaker, the Oden, from Wärtsilä. Hermelin
lobbied for buying the icebreaker from Finland because it would spare Sweden from
using extra resources in designing its own icebreaker and, after all, the Voima already
checked all of the boxes on Hermelin’s wish list.64 While the Swedish shipbuilding
industry was capable of building such advanced vessels, it was already specializing in
the serial production of large cargo ships. Hermelin obtained his modern Baltic ice-
breaker, and Wärtsilä was on its way to becoming the leading icebreaker builder in the
world.
Conclusions
Before the first ice-model basins in the 1950s and 1960s, the technological development
of icebreaking outpaced scientific understanding of ice mechanics. Icebreaker builders
based their design solutions on experience, observation and approximations. No state
had the resources for radical experimentation through trial and error, and neither was
any shipyard willing to risk building an icebreaker that possibly would not work. How
then did the technology change, given such a restricted and risk-averse framework?
We argue that, in contrast to nationalistic icebreaker histories that frame groundbreak-
ing innovations locally, the technological development of the icebreaker was essentially a
transnational process of knowledge transfer and adaptation. To deconstruct the
inward-looking narratives in the existing literature, we have examined the technical
establishment of certain icebreaker features – hull dimensions, diesel–electric propulsion
and propeller constellations – by focusing on the role of technology carriers, individuals
who were central to transferring technological solutions across borders. Our analysis of
the Swedish Ymer, the American ‘Winds’ and the Finnish Voima revealed that even the
most radical design solutions relied on the considerations and actions of a few, well-
connected technology carriers. Even though we have focused only on these three projects
for methodological reasons, it is worth remembering that these ideas were adopted and
applied to varying degree in other countries as well. It would require a larger project
to trace the wider network that conceived the Danish ship Bryderen (1884) and inspired
the Finnish development of the German ship Stettin (1933), with its sharp ‘Runeberg
bow’.
To recapitulate, technology carriers needed to have an interest in the technology in
question; they were part of an entity that was organized to make technological decisions,
they had the necessary social, economic and political power to realize their interest, they
had information about existing solutions and access to this technology, and finally, they
were able to acquire the needed knowledge on how to best manage the technology. These
facets of technology carriage are presented in Table 2 on a case-country level.
The key technology carriers in the transnational development of the icebreaker came
from salient stakeholder groups. They either represented state organizations, like the
Swedish organization Marinförvaltningen, the US Coast Guard or the Finnish
Maritime Administration MKH, or else they acted in a private capacity representing
industrial interests, like the Swedish electricity company ASEA or the Finnish
64. RA, Sjöfartsbyrån, SID, E1:9 Diarieförda skrivelser, letters from 1954.
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shipbuilder Wärtsilä. In all cases, it was the national need for an improved icebreaker
design that motivated expert actors to seek cooperation with one another and for govern-
ments to fund their efforts.
While these technology carriers were rarely system builders, they always had status in
key organizations and close connections with those who chose a technology and assumed
the risks, whether it was diesel–electric drive in the case of the Ymer, power-displacement
ratio in the case of the ‘Wind’ ships or the four-propeller constellation in the case of the
Voima.Who was and was not a state actor at any particular point reveals the messy com-
plexity of interactions between state and industry. Arctic technology specialists devel-
oped direct international connections with one another, and new ideas were adopted
through the resulting expert networks.
Most of the technology carriers who had a critical role in identifying and choosing
novel technological solutions had technical training or close personal connections with
technical experts. As buyers, governmental actors were often most active in pushing
for new technologies and providing the necessary political leverage to muster the eco-
nomic and intellectual resources necessary to realize novel technical solutions.
Technology carriers were able to visit ships and shipbuilding sites freely. Even though
the Swedish SIS and Finnish MKH were governmental agencies and the USCG a semi-
military organization, our technology carriers were able to transfer documents freely and
even copy critical details. We explain this situation via two factors. First, between 1890
and 1954 no single company or country had a particular interest in building icebreakers
for exports, nor were design solutions and technical details deemed commercial secrets.
The power ratio, hull lines and propeller constellation were not patentable innovations,
but rather best-known practices. Second, the technologies that the technology carriers
recorded during their visits to foreign yards were relatively general in nature and not con-
sidered military secrets (Figure 8).
Also, engineering journals published detailed reports of new icebreakers and repre-
sented another important source of information. Here, though, it is important to note a
language barrier. While Finnish and Swedish actors were fluent in the Nordic languages
and also often in German and English, following not only domestic affairs but also devel-
opments in other parts of northern Europe, most especially in the UK and the US,
American published sources were largely restricted to the English-speaking world. The
USCG therefore operated in a more limited intellectual context than the SIS or MKH.
This transnational approach to Arctic maritime technology did not change the nature
of the ships. The Ymer, the ‘Winds’ and the Voima were still manifestations of Swedish,
American and Finnish engineering skills, creative problem solving and state patronage.
Yet the approach adopted here realigns the focus by which we interpret icebreaker
history. National triumphs in maritime technology development are embedded in trans-
national, collaborative work between experts.
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